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Abstract
In a classical online decision problem, a decision-maker who is trying to maximize her value
inspects a sequence of arriving items to learn their values (drawn from known distributions), and
decides when to stop the process by taking the current item. The goal is to prove a “prophet
inequality”: that she can do approximately as well as a prophet with foreknowledge of all the
values. In this work, we investigate this problem when the values are allowed to be correlated.
Since non-trivial guarantees are impossible for arbitrary correlations, we consider a natural
“linear” correlation structure introduced by Bateni et al. [BDHS15] as a generalization of the
common-base value model of Chawla et al. [CMS15].
A key challenge is that threshold-based algorithms, which are commonly used for prophet
inequalities, no longer guarantee good performance for linear correlations. We relate this road-
block to another “augmentations” challenge that might be of independent interest: many exist-
ing prophet inequality algorithms are not robust to slight increase in the values of the arriving
items. We leverage this intuition to prove bounds (matching up to constant factors) that decay
gracefully with the amount of correlation of the arriving items. We extend these results to the
case of selecting multiple items by designing a new (1 + o(1)) approximation ratio algorithm
that is robust to augmentations.
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Schmidt Foundation.
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1 Introduction
In classic optimal-stopping problems, a decision-maker wishes to select one of a set [n] = {1, . . . , n}
of options whose values are distributed according to a known joint distribution. Option i material-
izes at time i, revealing its value Xi. The decision-maker must then either select option i, receiving
a value of Xi, or permanently reject it and continue. Her goal is to choose an option whose value,
in expectation over her selection algorithm and the randomness in the problem instance, obtains at
least a 1/α-fraction of the expected maximum value for some approximation ratio α ≥ 1. Such an
approximation is referred to as a “prophet inequality” as it compares the decision-maker’s perfor-
mance to that of a prophet who knows the realizations of all values in advance and can always stop
at the maximum. Examples of optimal-stopping problems include hiring, in which an employer
interviews a sequence of candidates and must make a hiring decision on the spot; or house-buying
in a sellers’ market, in which a buyer must make an offer at the open house. These optimal-stopping
problems became more popular in the last 15 years particularly because of their applications in
mechanism design. E.g., an α-prophet inequality often implies a posted-pricing mechanism that
gets a 1/α-fraction of the maximum welfare for a sequence of bidders arriving online (see related
work in Section 1.3).
The approximability of optimal stopping problems depends heavily on the correlations of the option
values. In the case where all the values are independent, a tight 2 approximation ratio was shown
by Krengel and Sucheston [KS78]. In 1984, Samuel-Cahn [SC84] presented a simple median-of-
maximum “threshold-based” rule with the same performance: compute τ as the median of the
distribution of the maximum value, and stop at the first Xi exceeding τ . Other threshold rules
are also known to obtain 2 approximation, e.g., Kleinberg and Weinberg [KW12] showed this for
τ = 12 E [maxiXi]. When the values are negatively correlated, the problem intuitively becomes even
easier than the independent case: observing and rejecting a low Xi increases the chances of seeing a
high Xi′ in the future (and vice versa accepting a large Xi decreases the chances of having missed a
highXi′ in the future). E.g., a simple implication of threshold-based algorithms is a 2 approximation
ratio for negatively associated (a form of negative correlation) values; see Appendix B. Rinott and
Samuel-Cahn [RSC+87, RSC91] indeed show that the value of the optimal stopping algorithm for
negative correlations exceeds that of the independent case, holding the marginals fixed. On the
other hand, with general and positive correlation structures, no algorithm can guarantee better
than Ω(n) approximation ratio (as is known from Hill and Kertz [HK92], and will also be a special
case of our lower bounds). Therefore, the question is how to impose a structure on the correlations
that both models interesting applications and allows for better bounds.
1.1 Linear Correlations Model
We consider a linear correlations model in which there exists a set of m independent variables
Y1, . . . , Ym, with each option value Xi being a positive linear combination of some subset:
X = A ·Y
where A is a nonnegative matrix. The algorithm is given the matrix A and the distributions of
all the Yjs, but when Xi arrives, it only finds Xi and not any of the realizations of the Yjs. This
model was introduced in an auctions context by Bateni et al. [BDHS15], where it was inspired by
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the common-base value model of Chawla et al. [CMS15]. It has two natural parameters capturing
the degree of correlation of an instance. If each row of A has at most srow nonzero entries (row
sparsity srow), this implies that each Xi only depends on at most srow different Yjs. On the other
hand, if each column of A has at most scol nonzero entries (column sparsity scol), this implies that
each Yj is only relevant to at most scol different Xis.
General applications. Linear correlations occur in applications when each option i is defined by
the degree Aij to which it exhibits each feature j ∈ [m]. The value
∑
j AijYj of the option is then
determined by the values Yj of its features, which is unknown to the decisionmaker. Of particular
interest in our setting are applications with many features, such as the hiring and house-buying
examples often used to motivate prophet problems. Other relevant applications include selecting
hotel rooms, restaurants, and movies. Here we elaborate on the hiring and house-buying examples,
noting how they naturally exhibit column or row sparsity.1
In a hiring application, the features of a candidate might include where he received his education, his
major, his work experience in each relevant industry, aspects of his personality, etc. When the em-
ployer interviews a candidate, she learns how much she likes him, but not how to attribute her value
for the candidate to particular features (every school/major/industry is a different feature). If the
candidate pool is diverse, so that candidates come from many different schools/majors/industries,
we might expect the instance to have a low column sparsity. Similarly, in house-buying, the features
of a house might include the commute time, the square footage, and various bells-and-whistles like
the existence of a patio, a hot-tub, a roof-deck, the number of parking spaces, if any. Again, the
value of a house is a linear combination of the value of its features, but when seeing a house, the
buyer may only be able to access and articulate an overall valuation. If each house has a limited
number of bells-and-whistles, we expect the instance to have low row-sparsity.
Mechanism design applications: Welfare for linearly correlated values. Prophet inequal-
ities can directly imply social welfare and revenue guarantees for sequential posted-price mecha-
nisms [CHMS10, KW12]. In the simplest model, a single item is for sale to a sequence of arriving
bidders with values X1, . . . ,Xn, drawn from distributions known to the seller. A threshold-τ stop-
ping rule immediately translates to a posted price τ . The item is purchased by the first bidder
whose value satisfies Xi ≥ τ . In particular, social welfare is the value of the bidder who pur-
chases the item, so a prophet inequality directly translates to a social welfare guarantee.2 While we
show that threshold-based policies fail for linearly correlated values, we obtain positive results with
inclusion-threshold policies. These correspond to offering a fixed posted price to a predetermined
subset of buyers, while the others are automatically rejected.
For linearly correlated bidder values, our positive results immediately imply social welfare guar-
antees using such inclusion-posted-price mechanisms. Here, linear correlations capture some com-
ponent of common values in bidder preferences. Namely, there are different features Y1, . . . , Ym of
the object, with bidder i placing weight Aij on feature j. In the mechanism-design setting, it is
1Note however that our bounds are expressed in terms of the minimum of row and column sparsity of an instance,
and hence apply even to instances with high row/column sparsity.
2Revenue guarantees, at least in the classical independent-Xi model, can be obtained using a threshold in virtual
value space.
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particularly natural to make our assumption that the decisionmaker (here, the seller) is not able
to access Yj when value Xi arrives.
Results. We start from the observation that threshold-based algorithms cannot guarantee good
approximation ratios as soon as any correlations are introduced. Therefore, we define inclusion-
threshold algorithms that probabilistically include a subset of the arrivals for consideration and
take the first arrival in this subset to exceed a threshold.
We first design an inclusion-threshold algorithm to obtain an O(scol) approximation ratio, i.e., a
guarantee that degrades gracefully as the amount of correlation increases, from the known O(1)
bound for the independent case to the known Θ(n) worst-case bound. Then, we design a more com-
plex inclusion-threshold algorithm to obtain an O(srow) approximation ratio, i.e., another gracefully
degrading guarantee. Together, these prove an O
(
min {srow, scol}
)
approximation guarantee for the
linear correlations model. We then design a lower bound instance and prove that this is tight up
to constants, i.e., no algorithm can guarantee better than an Ω
(
min {srow, scol}
)
approximation.
Main Result 1 (Informal Theorem 4.1). For the linearly correlated prophet problem, there exists
an O(min{scol, srow}) approximation ratio algorithm.
Finally, we extend these results to the case of selecting a subset of up to r of the arriving options
with a goal of maximizing their expected sum (also known as an r-uniform matroid constraint).
It is known that for independent distributions, 1 + o(1) approximation ratio prophet inequality
algorithms are possible for the case of large r [HKS07, Ala11]. We show a similar result for linearly
correlated instances with bounded column sparsity scol.
Main Result 2 (Informal Theorem 5.1). For the linearly correlated prophet problem where we
select r options, there exists a 1 + o(1) approximation ratio algorithm when r ≫ scol.
The case of bounded row sparsity, however, turns out to be harder: regardless of r, no algorithm
can guarantee better than an Ω(srow) approximation ratio for unbounded scol, as in the r = 1 case.
1.2 Techniques and the Augmented Prophets Problem
A crucial technique for our results is to introduce and solve the augmented prophets problem.
The idea is to suppose we have an instance with independent random variables Z1, . . . , Zn and
an algorithm, say a threshold rule, guaranteeing some approximation ratio. Now suppose we
“augment” the instance by sending instead the values X1 := Z1 +W1, . . . , Xn := Zn +Wn where
the Wis are nonnegative. Does the algorithm (which does not know Wis) continue to guarantee
its original approximation ratio (measured against the maximum Zi)? One would hope so, as each
arriving option has only increased, while the benchmark has not. However, this turns out not to
be true for the median-of-maximum threshold rule. E.g., if Zi ∼ Bernoulli(p) i.i.d. for p≪
1
n , the
median is zero, and augmenting the first arrival to a miniscule positive value causes the (strict)
median threshold rule to always take it, resulting in an arbitrarily poor approximation. Luckily, we
show that the half-of-expected-maximum threshold algorithm retains its approximation guarantees,
even when the Wis are chosen by an adversary depending on the past Xi′s, i.e., i
′ < i.
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Armed with this “augmentation lemma”, we use subsampling to obtain inclusion sets of arrivals
{Xi} with significant independent portions {Zi}. In the bounded scol case, direct subsampling of
arrivals succeeds. The case where srow is bounded but Yj can appear in any number of arrivals is
more challenging. We show it suffices to obtain a contention-resolution style subsampling of the
arrivals such that each Yj is well-represented, but only with its maximum coefficient Aij . We then
use a graph-theoretic argument to construct such a scheme.
The augmented prophets problem is also our key technique for the linearly correlated prophets
problem with an r-uniform matroid constraint. In this case, however, we notice that none of the
existing 1+o(1) algorithms are robust to augmentations. Hence we design a new 1+o(1) algorithm
and prove its robustness using a much more sophisticated analysis involving a sequence of thresholds
and “buckets” with different cardinality constraints. By combining this augmentation result with
random partitioning of the input, we obtain the 1 + o(1) approximation for the r-uniform matroid
problem with fixed scol.
Main Result 3 (Informal Lemma 3.2 and 3.4). For the augmented prophets problem, there exists
a 2 approximation ratio algorithm when selecting a single option and a 1 + o(1) approximation
ratio algorithm when selecting r ≫ 1 options.
One can also view the augmented prophets problem as capturing correlations induced by a mis-
chievous wish-granting genie who awards bonuses Wi ≥ 0 at each step, but tries to choose them so
as to worsen the algorithm’s performance. We think this problem is of independent interest and
will find further applications in designing robust prophet inequality algorithms.
1.3 Related Work
The last decade has seen significant interest in prophet inequalities motivated by their appli-
cations in mechanism design. Many works focus on multiple-choice prophet inequality prob-
lems. This includes prophet inequalities for uniform matroids in [HKS07, Ala11], for general
matroids in [CHMS10, Yan11, KW12, FSZ16, LS18], for matchings and combinatorial auctions
in [AHL12, FGL15, DFKL17, EHKS18], and for arbitrary packing constraints in [Rub16, RS17].
There has also been a lot of work on variants of prophet inequalities: the prophet secretary prob-
lem where the values arrive in a random order [EHLM17, AEE+17, CFH+17, EHKS18, ACK18,
LS18, CSZ19], and the limited information setting where we only have sample-access to distribu-
tions [AKW14, CDFS19, RWW20]. All these works assume mutually independent values, whereas
capturing correlations and designing robust algorithms is the main challenge in our work.
Rinott and Samuel-Cahn [RSC+87, RSC91, RSC92] study correlated prophet inequalities. However,
their techniques are not applicable to our work because their positive results hold only for negatively
correlated values. Furthermore, their benchmark is the expected maximum of independent values
having the same marginal distributions. This benchmark could be a factor n larger than the
expected maximum for positively correlated values.
Our approach via the augmented prophets problem is also related to the line of work on de-
signing robust stochastic optimization algorithms. Since algorithms that assume known input
distributions tend to over-fit, here the goal is to design algorithms that are robust to adversarial
6
noise (see [Dia18, Moi18, DKK+16, LRV16, CSV17, DKK+18, EKM18, LMPL18, BGSZ20] and ref-
erences therein). Our single-item and multiple-items augmentation algorithms can be seen as robust
prophet inequality algorithms that retain their guarantees even when the input distributions are
augmented by an adversary. Another relevant reference is that of Du¨tting and Kesselheim [DK19],
which gives prophet inequalities assuming only probability distributions that are ǫ-close (in some
metric) to the true distributions. Their technical results, however, are not useful here because
augmented distributions can be very far from the original distributions.
2 Model and Fixed-Threshold Algorithms
2.1 Model and Notation
In the linear correlations model, there are n random variables X1,X2, . . . ,Xn that linearly depend
on m independent nonnegative random variables (sometimes called features) Y1, Y2, . . . , Ym as
X = A ·Y,
where matrix A only contains non-negative entries. Let srow denote the row-sparsity of A (maximum
number of nonzero entries in any row) and scol denote the column-sparsity of A (maximum number
of nonzero entries in any column).
An online algorithm is initially given A and the distributions of Y1, . . . , Ym. Then, it observes
the realizations of X1, . . . ,Xn one at a time. After observing Xi, the algorithm decides either to
stop and take the reward Xi, ending the process, or to reject Xi and continue to Xi+1. Given
such an algorithm ALG, we abuse notation by writing ALG for the reward of the algorithm, a
random variable. The algorithm has an approximation ratio of α for some α(n, srow, scol) if for all
n, srow, scol and all instances of the problem with these parameters,
E[ALG] ≥
1
α(n, srow, scol)
· E[max
i
Xi].
Such a guarantee is often called a prophet inequality because it compares the algorithm to a
“prophet” that can predict the realizations of all Xi in advance and take maxi{Xi} every time.
We use the notation (·)+ to mean max{·, 0}.
Our examples frequently use random variables that are either zero or some fixed positive value. We
say the variable is active if it takes its positive value. We sometimes say that Xi “includes” Yj if
Aij > 0.
2.2 Fixed-Threshold Algorithms
A fixed-threshold algorithm selects a single threshold τ and takes the first arrival Xi that exceeds
τ . We refer to such an algorithm as ALGτ . Fixed-threshold algorithms have been very successful
in prophet inequality design. However, our first result shows their severe limitation for even mildly
correlated prophet inequalities.
Lemma 2.1. In the linear correlations model, even for srow = scol = 2 there exist instances where
every fixed threshold τ algorithm ALGτ has an approximation ratio at least Ω(n).
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The full proof is deferred to Appendix D, but the instance is important and described next. Intu-
itively, the problem is that cases where an arrival Xi just crosses the threshold may be correlated
with some later Xi′ being very large. Taking Xi prevents the algorithm from ever obtaining the
gains from Xi′ . Our proof uses the following “tower” variables, which will also be useful later.
Definition 2.2 (Tower Y variables). Given ǫ > 0, define the tower Y variables as Yi =
1
ǫi
with
probability ǫi and Yi = 0 otherwise for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Example 2.3 (srow = scol = 2 tower instance). Take the tower Y variables. Let A be an n × n
matrix with entry Ai,i = 1 for all i and Ai,i+1 = ǫ for i ∈ [1, n−1]. All other entries are 0. Visually,
X1 = Y1 + ǫY2, X2 = Y2 + ǫY3, . . . , Xn = Yn.
We have scol = srow = 2. The point is that if Xi is nonzero, then almost certainly Xi =
1
ǫi
. But
in this case, a threshold algorithm cannot distinguish between the more likely case that Yi =
1
ǫi
, in
which case it should stop and take Xi, and the unlikely case that Yi = 0 and Yi+1 =
1
ǫi+1
, in which
case it should wait and take Xi+1.
Indeed, these coefficients of matrix A play an important role, and in Appendix A we show that
when entries of A are restricted to being only 0 or 1, there exists a constant-factor approximation
fixed-threshold algorithm. Roughly this happens because each Yj has “limited influence” on any
Xi: either Yj appears with coefficient 0 and has no influence on Xi, or it appears with coefficient
1 and has the same influence on every such Xi.
Theorem 2.4. The unweighted linear correlations problem has a fixed threshold constant-factor
approximation algorithm.
This raises the question whether for a general matrix A any policy can achieve a better approxi-
mation, let alone a simple policy. Our positive results will show that relatively simple inclusion-
threshold algorithms can achieve tight prophet inequalities.
Definition 2.5. An inclusion-threshold algorithm selects a subset S ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and threshold τ ,
possibly both at random, and selects the first Xi such that i ∈ S and Xi ≥ τ . In other words, it
commits to a subset S of arrivals and applies a threshold policy to those Xi, ignoring the others.
3 Our Approach of Handling Correlations via Augmentations
In analysis of prophet inequalities, the problem is to upper-bound the expected maximum of the
variables Xi as compared to one’s algorithm. An important and common approach is to use the
fact that for any threshold τ ,
E[max
i
Xi] ≤ τ + E[max
i
(Xi − τ)
+] ≤ τ +
∑
i
E[(Xi − τ)
+]. (1)
When all the arrivals Xi are independent, it is known that one can always select τ such that the
left and right sides of (1) differ by at most a constant factor, i.e., ee−1 ≈ 1.6 (this is related to
the correlation gap [ADSY12]). In fact, the prototypical prophets analysis shows that setting some
threshold τ allows ALGτ to approximate the right hand side up to a constant factor. However, when
{Xi} are correlated, this could be a very loose upper bound. E.g., consider X1 = · · · = Xn = Y1 ∼
Bernoulli(p). The left side equals p while the right side equals τ+np(1−τ) = np+τ(1−np) ≥ np for
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p < 1n . So the right side can be a factor n larger than the left, and we cannot hope to approximate
the right side with any algorithm.
One approach to correlated prophets could be a direct analysis of the right-hand side of (1) in cases
of limited correlation. Here, we take a different approach. The first key idea is to use inclusion-
threshold algorithms. To see why, consider a first attempt: discard certain Xi such that we are
only left with a subset that are all independent of each other. Now a standard prophet algorithm
that only considers these Xi would obtain a constant factor of the maximum in this subset. One
could then hope to argue that this subset’s maximum approximates the original maximum up to a
factor depending on the amount of correlation. Indeed, one can show that this approach succeeds
on the tower instance in Example 2.3 with srow = scol = 2, e.g., by including every other Xi. But
in general this approach cannot give tight bounds. This is because each Xi contains srow variables,
each of which can appear in up to scol−1 other Xi′ , so including Xi requires eliminating ≈ srowscol
other variables. Our goal is to achieve approximations to within min{srow, scol} factors even if
max{srow, scol} = n.
So in addition to including only a subset of Xi, we will use a second key idea: decompose each
variable as Xi = Zi +Wi, where the Zis satisfy independence requirements and Wis are viewed as
“bonus” augmentations. We will show that E[maxi Zi] is an approximation to E[maxiXi]. Then we
will compete with E[maxi Zi]. However, the augmentations add an additional challenge, requiring
us to solve the following problem.
Definition 3.1 (Single-Item Augmented Prophets Problem). The algorithm is given the distribu-
tions of a set of independent nonnegative random variables Z1, . . . , Zn. Then, it observes one at a
time the realizations of Xi = Zi +Wi for i ∈ [1, n], where each Wi is nonnegative and Zi is inde-
pendent of X1, . . . ,Xi−1 for each i (but Wi could depend on X1, . . . ,Xi). The algorithm chooses
at each step whether to continue or stop and obtain value Xi. It must compete with E[maxi Zi].
One can view the augmented prophets problem as capturing correlations induced by a mischievous
genie who awards bonuses Wi ≥ 0 at each step so as to worsen the algorithm’s performance. We
note that the genie cannot base her choices on the future, i.e., Wi is a random variable that may
be correlated with Zi′ if i
′ ≤ i but not if i′ > i.
Intuitively, it might seem like algorithms for prophets problems should continue to perform well,
as the genie can only increase the rewards at each step. However, this is not true for the classical
median stopping rule, i.e, for τ = the median of maxi Zi (see an example in Section 1.2). Luckily,
a different threshold rule is robust:
Lemma 3.2 (Single-item Augmentation lemma). For the augmented prophets problem, a fixed
threshold algorithm with τ = 12E[maxi Zi] guarantees
E[ALGτ ]
E[maxi Zi]
≥ 12 .
Proof. We “augment” a standard prophet inequality proof. Let P = Pr[maxiXi ≥ τ ]. Now,
E[ALGτ ] = P · τ +
∑
i
Pr[Xi′ < τ (∀i
′ < i)] · E
[
(Xi − τ)
+ | Xi′ < τ (∀i
′ < i)
]
≥ P · τ +
∑
i
(1− P ) · E
[
(Xi − τ)
+ | Xi′ < τ (∀i
′ < i)
]
because ALGτ selects no element with probability 1−P . Nonnegativity of Wi implies Xi ≥ Zi, so
E[ALGτ ] ≥ P · τ +
∑
i
(1− P ) · E
[
(Zi − τ)
+ | Xi′ < τ (∀i
′ < i)
]
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= P · τ + (1− P ) · E
[∑
i
(Zi − τ)
+
]
because Zi is independent of the event {Xi′ < τ (∀i
′ < i)}. Since
∑
i(Zi − τ)
+ ≥ maxi(Zi − τ)
+,
E[ALGτ ] ≥ P · τ + (1− P ) · E
[
max
i
(Zi − τ)
+
]
≥ P · τ + (1− P ) · E
[
max
i
Zi − τ
]
= P · τ + (1− P )τ = τ.
This proves that E[ALGτ ] ≥
1
2E[maxi Zi], as claimed.
Multiple Items. The key idea in proving our 1 + o(1) approximation ratio result for selecting
multiple items for bounded scol is to extend the augmentation lemma to cardinality constraints.
Definition 3.3 (Multiple-Items Augmented Prophets Problem). In the augmented prophets prob-
lem with cardinality constraint r, the algorithm is given the distributions of a set of independent
nonnegative random variables Z1, . . . , Zn. Then, it observes one at a time the realizations of
Xi = Zi +Wi for i ∈ [1, n], where each Wi is nonnegative and satisfies that each Zi is independent
of X1, . . . ,Xi−1. The algorithm chooses at each step to reject or accept Xi subject to taking at most
r variables total. It must compete with E
[∑r
i=1 Z
(i)
]
, where Z(i) is the ith-largest {Z1, . . . , Zn}.
Since none of the prior 1 + o(1) approximation ratio algorithms for multiple-items is robust to
augmentations, in Section 5.3 we design a new algorithm to prove the following multiple-items
augmentation lemma.
Lemma 3.4. (Multiple-Items Augmentation Lemma). There is an algorithm for the augmented
prophets problem with cardinality constraint r achieving a
(
1 +O
( (log r)3/2
r1/4
))
approximation ratio.
Next, we utilize the single-item augmentation lemma, along with careful decompositions of {Xi},
to separately attack the single-item problem for the cases of bounded srow and scol.
4 Selecting a Single Item
In this section we prove our main theorem. Later, we will also address cases where the algorithm
can take multiple items.
Theorem 4.1. There exists an inclusion-threshold algorithm for the linearly correlated prophet
problem with approximation ratio O(min{scol, srow}).
We will first show in Proposition 4.2 that an inclusion-threshold algorithm guarantees O(scol); then
in Proposition 4.4 that an inclusion-threshold algorithm achieves O(srow). The algorithm that runs
one of these according to which of scol, srow is smaller is an inclusion-threshold algorithm achieving
the claimed performance.
We will see that bounded column sparsity is the easier case, requiring a simpler algorithm and
analysis. For the case of bounded row sparsity, we will need much more careful reasoning about
dependencies and correlations between Yj. This difficulty will also manifest quantitatively when
we move to the cardinality-constraint setting in Section 5, where better bounds will be achievable
only in the case of bounded column sparsity.
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4.1 Bounded Column Sparsity
Recall that column sparsity scol is the maximum number of times a given feature Yj may appear
with nonzero coefficient. We now give a relatively straightforward algorithm for achieving Ω
(
1
scol
)
fraction of E[maxiXi]. The idea is similar to the “first attempt” described in Section 3, using the
single-item augmentation lemma (Lemma 3.2) to overcome the challenges discussed there.
Proposition 4.2. There exists an inclusion-threshold algorithm for the linearly correlated prophet
problem with approximation ratio 2e · scol.
Proof. Choose S ⊆ [n] by including each i ∈ [n] independently with probability 1scol . This gives the
inclusion subset; now we define the threshold τ . Assign each Yj to the first survivingXi that includes
it, i.e., for each i ∈ S, construct a set Ti :=
{
j : Aij > 0 and Ai′j = 0 (∀i
′ ∈ S where i′ < i)
}
. Let
Zi =
∑
j∈Ti AijYj and set τ =
1
2E[max{Z1, . . . , Zn}]. If i 6∈ S, then Ti = ∅ and Zi = 0.
By definition of an inclusion-threshold algorithm (Definition 2.5), we automatically reject any Xi
such that i 6∈ S, and we select the first arriving Xi such that i ∈ S and Xi ≥ τ .
Now, by construction, we can write Xi = Zi +Wi where each Zi contains only variables Yj not
appearing in any prior Xi′ for i
′ ∈ S and i′ < i. So Zi is independent of the preceding Xi′ under
consideration. Hence by the single-item augmentation lemma (Lemma 3.2), E[ALG] ≥ 12E[maxi Zi].
Next, we show that E[maxi Zi] is comparable to E[maxiXi].
Claim 4.3. E[max{Z1, . . . , Zn}] ≥
1
e·scolE[max{X1, . . . ,Xn}], where the expectation is over the
construction of S as well as Y1, . . . , Yn.
Proof of Claim 4.3. We prove that for every fixed realization of Y1, . . . , Yn, the inequality holds in
expectation over S. Let Xi∗ = maxiXi. For each Yj with Ai∗j > 0, we claim Pr[j ∈ Ti] ≥
1
e·scol
because Xi survives with probability
1
scol
and independently, the other at most scol − 1 variables
Xi′ with Ai′j > 0 all fail to survive with probability at least
3
(
1− 1scol
)scol−1
≥ 1e . (If scol = 1, then
this probability is 1.) So with probability only over the construction of S,
ES[Zi∗ ] =
∑
j
Pr[j ∈ Ti∗ ]Ai∗jYj ≥
1
e · scol
∑
j
Ai∗jYj =
1
e · scol
Xi∗ .
So we have ES [Zi∗ ] ≥
1
e·scol maxiXi, so ES [maxi Zi] ≥
1
e·scol maxiXi. This holds for each fixed
realization of Y1, . . . , Yn, so it holds in expectation.
Claim 4.3 completes the proof of Proposition 4.2, as we have
E[ALG] ≥
1
2
E[max
i
Zi] ≥
1
2e · scol
E[max
i
Xi].
4.2 Bounded Row Sparsity
Recall that row sparsity srow implies that each Xi only depends on at most srow different features Yj ;
however, a given Yj may appear in arbitrarily many Xis. In this section, for notational convenience,
3We often use the inequality
(
1− 1
N
)N−1
=
(
N−1
N
)N−1
≥ 1
e
, which follows from
(
N
N−1
)N−1
=
(
1 + 1
N−1
)N−1
≤ e.
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we assume without loss of generality that maxi{Aij} = 1 for all j. (If this is not the case, one can
renormalize each column and redefine a scaled version of Yj.) We prove the following:
Proposition 4.4. There exists an inclusion-threshold algorithm for the linearly correlated prophets
problem achieving approximation ratio 2e3 · srow.
This case requires more care. There does not seem to be an analogous approach to randomly
excluding Xi, as for bounded column sparsity. Moreover, an important observation is that the Xi
cannot be treated identically in a manner oblivious to the structure of A. For every “important”
row that ought to be included, there can be many unimportant rows. Indeed, we can take any
instance and prepend it with arbitrarily many variables of the form Xi = Y1 without changing the
row sparsity srow. An oblivious inclusion-threshold algorithm would essentially keep only variables
from this prefix, ignoring the actual instance.
Before the formal proof of Proposition 4.4, we develop a tool to address this challenge. The key
idea is to design an inclusion scheme that, for any instance structure, allows each Yj to be both
represented and “independent” with a reasonably high probability. Here independence refers to not
sharing an Xi with any other included Yj′ . Inspired by contention-resolution schemes, which have
a similar flavor, we define a representative construction of a subset of the Yj and corresponding Xi
with Aij = 1, where Xi is matched to Yj(i).
Definition 4.5. Consider a randomized selection of S ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and T ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} of equal
size with a perfect matching j(i) satisfying Aij(i) = 1. Call this construction α-representative or
α-rep. if
(i) for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, we have Pr[j ∈ T ] ≥ α, and
(ii) for all i, i′ ∈ S, i 6= i′, we have Ai′j(i) = 0.
Note that we cannot hope for better than an O( 1srow )-rep. construction, as any inclusion of some Yj
can rule out srow−1 other features. This raises the question of whether one can achieve Ω(
1
srow
)-rep.
Lemma 4.6. For any linearly correlated instance there exists a 1e2·srow rep. construction.
Proof. For each Yj, define its primary i(j) by picking any i such that Aij = 1 (by our renormaliza-
tion assumption, there is at least one). Consider a directed graph G where the nodes are {1, . . . ,m}
representing the independent variables Yj. There is a directed edge (j, j
′) if Ai(j)j′ > 0, i.e., j points
to all other j′ who are included in its primary variable Xi(j). We note that both edges (j, j′) and
(j′, j) might be present.
The key property is that each vertex in G has out degree ≤ srow − 1, as Yj has only one primary
Xi(j) and at most srow − 1 other variables j
′ have Ai(j)j′ > 0. Because average in-degree equals
average out-degree, this implies there exists a vertex with in-degree at most srow−1. Applying this
argument recursively, we get the following claim.
Claim 4.7. There exists an order π of the vertices of G such that for every j, the induced subgraph
on π(1), . . . , π(j) satisfies that the in-degree of π(j) is at most srow − 1.
Proof. As shown, there exists some j with in-degree at most srow− 1. Set π(m) = j. Now delete j
from the graph, including all edges to and from j. In this graph again all out-degrees are at most
srow − 1, so we can recursively construct π(m− 1), . . . , π(1).
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Consider all the Yj variables in the order π given by Claim 4.7. Initialize S, T = ∅. On consid-
ering j, if j does not have an edge with any vertex j′ ∈ T (neither incoming nor outgoing), then
independently with probability 1srow , add j to T and add j(i) (its primary variable) to S. With the
remaining probability, ignore j and continue. We show that this randomized construction of S, T
satisfies the two properties of a 1
e2·srow rep. construction.
For Property (i), note each j has at most 2(srow − 1) total edges (both incoming and outgoing) to
nodes j′ appearing prior to j in the permutation: j has at most srow − 1 outgoing edges in total,
and by construction of π, has at most srow− 1 incoming edges from nodes prior to j in π. So when
we reach j in the permutation, we consider it with probability at least the probability that all these
2(srow − 1) neighbors have been rejected, which is at least
(
1− 1srow
)2(srow−1)
≥ 1
e2
; and then we
include it with probability 1srow . This shows that each j is included with probability at least
1
e2·srow .
Next, for Property (ii), consider any i, i′ ∈ S with respective partners j, j′ ∈ T . We must show
Aij′ = 0. Note that by construction, i = i(j) and i
′ = i(j′), i.e., they are the primary variables for
j, j′. Either j was selected into T before or after j′. In either case, the second variable could only
be selected if edge (j, j′) did not exist in the graph, which implies Aij′ = 0.
This completes the proof of Lemma 4.6.
Given our representative construction, we are ready to complete the algorithm and proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.4. The algorithm is an inclusion-threshold algorithm. Its inclusion set S is
obtained by calling our representative construction of Lemma 4.6, which also produces a choice j(i)
for each i ∈ S. Define Zi = Yj(i) for each i ∈ S and Zi = 0 if i 6∈ S. Set τ =
1
2E[maxi Zi].
By the second property of representative constructions, Zi is independent of Xi′ for all i
′ ∈ S, i′ 6= i.
Therefore, by the Augmentation Lemma (Lemma 3.2),
E[ALG] ≥
1
2
E[max
i
Zi]. (2)
Combining this with the following Lemma 4.8 will prove Proposition 4.4.
Lemma 4.8. E[maxi Zi] ≥
1
e3·srowE[maxiXi].
Before proving Lemma 4.8, we will need one more idea. Let Ri = {j : Aij > 0}, the variables
included in Xi. Notice that we may have |Ri ∩ T | ≥ 2, i.e., multiple variables Yj are members of
Xi and appear in the construction T . This can occur when Xi is not primary for any of them.
4 It
will help to lower-bound the probability that Yj is the unique member of Ri ∩ T .
Claim 4.9. Under the construction of Lemma 4.6, for each j ∈ Ri, Pr[Ri ∩ T = {j}] ≥
1
e3·srow .
Proof. We have Pr[j ∈ T ] ≥ 1
e2·srow by the representative construction. Meanwhile, conditioned on
any other decisions, each j′ is included in T with probability at most 1srow , because it is considered
with probability at most 1 and included independently with probability 1srow conditioned on being
considered. So Pr[Ri ∩ T = {j}|j ∈ T ] ≥
(
1− 1srow
)srow−1 ≥ 1e .
Proof of Lemma 4.8. Fix the realizations of all Yj. Let i
∗ = argmaxiXi. First, notice that
E[max
i
Zi] = E[max
j∈T
{
Yj
}
] ≥ E
[
max
j∈T∩Ri∗
{
Ai∗j · Yj
}]
.
4An illuminating instance is: Xi = Yi for all i ≤ srow and Xsrow+1 = 0.99(Y1 + · · ·+ Ysrow).
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Now the expected maximum of elements in T ∩Ri∗ is at least the sum over the elements of each’s
contribution to the max, which is at least the chance it is the unique survivor times its value. This
allows us to relate a max to a sum, and it relies on the fact that the representative construction’s
randomness is independent of the realizations of the {Yj}. Thus,
E[max
i
Zi] ≥ E
[
max
j∈T∩Ri∗
{
Ai∗j · Yj
}]
≥
∑
j
Pr
[
T ∩Ri∗ = {j}
]
·Ai∗jYj ≥
∑
j
1
e3 · srow
Ai∗jYj,
where the last inequality uses Claim 4.9. Since
∑
j Ai∗jYj = Xi∗ , we have E[maxi Zi] ≥
1
e3·srowXi∗
. Taking expectations over Y1, . . . , Yn completes the proof.
Finally, combining (2) with Lemma 4.8 completes the proof of Proposition 4.4.
4.3 Lower Bounds
We now give a matching hardness result, showing that no algorithm can do better than our results
in the previous section up to constant factors.
Example 4.10 (General tower instance). Take the tower Y variables (recall Yi =
1
ǫi
with proba-
bility ǫi, and 0 otherwise). Given input integer c, set n = srow = scol = c. Let A be an n×n matrix
with entry Ai,j = 0 for j < i and Ai,j = ǫ
j−i for j ≥ i. Visually,
X1 = Y1 + ǫY2 + · · · · · · + ǫ
nYn, X2 = Y2 + ǫY3 + · · · + ǫ
n−1Yn, . . . , Xn = Yn.
The difficulty here amplifies that of Example 2.3. If any of Yi, Yi+1, . . . , Yn are active, then this
will cause Xi to be nonzero. Assuming only one of these variables is active (by far the most likely
case), it is impossible for the algorithm to tell whether to stop or continue.
It will turn out that this instance is hard even if the algorithm is given additional power.
Definition 4.11. In the fractional variant of the prophet problem, at each arrival i, the algorithm
may choose to take a fraction pi of the current arrival Xi subject to always taking at most one unit
in total, i.e.,
∑n
i=1 pi ≤ 1 with probability 1. Its reward is
∑n
i=1 piXi.
One strategy available in the fractional prophet problem is to spend the entire budget on a single
arrival, which is an algorithm for the standard prophets problem. So a lower bound for the fractional
problem immediately implies a lower bound for the prophets problem.
Theorem 4.12. In the linearly correlated prophet problem, even if fractional, no online algorithm
can guarantee a smaller approximation ratio than min{scol, srow}.
Proof. We consider a family of instances of Example 4.10 where n = scol = srow. Since for every i
we have Xi ≥ Yi, we get that for sufficiently small ǫ,
E[max
i
{Xi}] ≥ E[max
j
{Yj}] =
n∑
i=1
ǫi
∏
j>i
(1− ǫj) ·
1
ǫi
≥ n(1− ǫ)n ≥ n(1− nǫ).
On the other hand, we show every online algorithm that may even fractionally select elements has
value at most 1/(1 − ǫ)2. This implies the approximation ratio can be n(1 − nǫ)(1 − ǫ)2, which
tends to n as ǫ→ 0.
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Lemma 4.13. Suppose at arrival i we have p =
∑
i′<i pi′ and Xi = 1/ǫ
i. Conditioned on this
event, any online algorithm obtains expected value from elements i, . . . , n at most (1− p)/ǫi.
Before proving Lemma 4.13, we use it to prove that every algorithm has O(1) expected value.
Notice that if Xi > 1/ǫ
i then the online algorithm should never accept any fraction of the element
Xi as Xi+1 is guaranteed to be larger. Hence by Lemma 4.13, the optimal algorithm ALG takes
the smallest i for which Xi = 1/ǫ
i, which means
E[ALG] ≤
∑
i≥1
Pr
[(
Xj > 1/ǫ
j for all j < i
)
&
(
Xi = 1/ǫ
i
)]
·
1
ǫi
=
∑
i≥1
Pr[Yi−1 = 1/ǫi−1] ·
(
Pr[Xi = 1/ǫ
i]
)
·
1
ǫi
≤
∑
i≥1
Pr[Yi−1 = 1/ǫi−1] ·
(∑
j≥i
Pr[Yj = 1/ǫ
j ]
)
·
1
ǫi
=
∑
i≥1
ǫi−1
∑
j≥i
ǫj ·
1
ǫi
≤
∑
i≥1
ǫi−1
1− ǫ
≤
1
(1− ǫ)2
.
Now we prove the missing lemma.
Proof of Lemma 4.13. We prove this lemma by reverse induction on i. It is immediately true for
i = n, as spending the entire remaining budget 1 − p on acquiring Xi =
1
ǫi
is optimal. To prove
the inductive step, notice the optimal online algorithm can be written as a convex combination of
the following two algorithms: one that spends the entire remaining budget of (1 − p) on Xi and
another one that spends no budget on Xi and plays optimally afterwards. We argue that the first
algorithm is better, which means its expected value is (1− p)/ǫi.
Observe that the second algorithm obtains nonnegative reward only if one of Yjs for j > i is active.
In this case Xi+1 = 1/ǫ
i+1 (note it cannot be larger because Xi = 1/ǫ
i), and hence by induction
hypothesis the optimal online algorithm gets value Xi+1 = (1− p)/ǫ
i+1. Thus, the expected value
of the algorithm is
Pr
[
∃j > i s.t. Yj = 1/ǫ
j | Xi = 1/ǫ
i
]
· (1− p)/ǫi+1.
We show Pr
[
∃j > i s.t. Yj = 1/ǫ
j | Xi = 1/ǫ
i
]
≤ ǫ, which implies the first algorithm is always
better. To see this, notice
Pr
[
∃j > i s.t. Yj = 1/ǫ
j | Xi = 1/ǫ
i
]
=
Pr
[(
∃j > i s.t. Yj = 1/ǫ
j
)
&
(
Xi = 1/ǫ
i]
)]
Pr[Xi = 1/ǫi]
=
∑
j>i Pr
[(
Yj = 1/ǫ
j
)
&
(
Xi = 1/ǫ
i]
)]
∑
j≥i Pr
[(
Yj = 1/ǫj
)
&
(
Xi = 1/ǫi]
)]
=
∑
j>i ǫ
j/(1 − ǫj) ·
∏
j′≥i(1− ǫ
j′)∑
j≥i ǫj/(1 − ǫj) ·
∏
j′≥i(1− ǫj
′)
=
∑
j>i ǫ
j/(1 − ǫj)∑
j≥i ǫj/(1 − ǫj)
.
Now using 1 + x ≤ 11−x ≤ 1 + 2x for 0 ≤ x < 0.5, we get
Pr
[
∃j > i s.t. Yj = 1/ǫ
j | Xi = 1/ǫ
i
]
≤
∑
j≥i+1 ǫ
j · (1 + 2ǫj)∑
j≥i ǫj · (1 + ǫj)
=
ǫi+1 − ǫn+1 + (2ǫ2i+2 − 2ǫ2n+2)/(1 + ǫ)
ǫi − ǫn+1 + (ǫ2i − ǫ2n+2)/(1 + ǫ)
≤ ǫ,
15
where the last inequality uses ǫ < 1/2 and ǫn < 2.
5 Selecting Multiple Items
In this section, we show that our approach via augmentations extends to a variant of the problem
in which one may take up to r ∈ N of the arriving variables X1, . . . ,Xn. Let Q ⊆ {1, . . . , n} be the
indices chosen by ALG with |Q| ≤ r. Let X(i) denote the ith-largest realized variable (we later use
notation Z(i) for the ith-largest among {Z1, . . . , Zn} as well). We have
ALG =
∑
i∈Q
Xi while OPT =
r∑
i=1
X(i).
We refer to this problem as a cardinality constraint of r. It is also referred to as selecting an
independent set of a rank-r matroid in the special case of r-uniform matroids.
In this setting, there will be significant differences between row and column sparsity assumptions.
We will show that for bounded column sparsity scol, one can design (1 + o(1))-approximation
algorithms for cardinalities r →∞, while this does not hold for bounded row sparsity srow.
5.1 Bounded Column Sparsity
As r →∞, we will show for bounded column sparsity an approximation ratio approaching 1.
Theorem 5.1. For a fixed scol, the linearly correlated prophets problem with cardinality constraint
r admits a
(
1 +O
(
(scolr )
1/5(log r)6/5
))
-approximation.
The key idea is to prove an augmentation lemma for selecting multiple items (restated below).
Lemma 3.4. (Multiple-Items Augmentation Lemma). There is an algorithm for the augmented
prophets problem with cardinality constraint r achieving a
(
1 +O
( (log r)3/2
r1/4
))
approximation ratio.
In Section 5.3 we prove this augmentation lemma, but before we use it to prove Theorem 5.1.
The idea of the reduction is that by randomly partitioning the variables into scol/ǫ
′ “groups” gives
us multiple independent Augmented Prophets problems. We think of each group as a subproblem
of selecting ǫ′r/scol elements and use the Augmentation Lemma to approximately solve it.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Formally, let there be c = scol/ǫ
′ sets, which we call groups, B1, . . . , Bc. For
each Xi, place it in a group j ∈ {1, . . . , c} chosen uniformly at random. For each Xi, let
X ′i =
∑
AijYj · 1[Yj only appears once in the group containing Xi]
denote the sum of Xi’s components Yj that do not appear with any other variable in the group
containing Xi. Let OPT
′
j denote the sum of the largest ǫ
′r/scol elements X ′i in group Bj .
Claim 5.2. E
[∑
j OPT
′
j
]
≥ (1− ǫ′) · E[OPT].
Proof. Consider a fixed Xi. Condition on Xi landing in a group. Notice that each of its Yjs have at
least 1− ǫ′ chance of appearing only with Xi in this group, and hence it contributes to OPT′j.
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Since each group Bj forms a separate instance of the Augmented Prophets problems, we can apply
the Augmentation Lemma 3.4 on each of them. Let ALGj denote the algorithm’s performance in
group j. By selecting ǫ′ less than O
( (log r)3/2
(ǫ′r/scol)1/4
)
, i.e., choosing ǫ′ = Θ
(
(scolr )
1/5(log r)6/5
)
, we get∑
j
E[ALGj ] ≥
∑
j
(1−O(ǫ′)) · E[OPT′j] ≥ (1−O(ǫ
′)) · E[OPT],
where the last inequality uses Claim 5.2.
5.2 Bounded Row Sparsity
For cardinality constraints, the symmetry between bounds for row and column sparsity breaks:
One cannot guarantee better than a Θ(srow) approximation in general even as r →∞. In fact, this
follows by reducing to our previous hardness result for fractional prophets.
Theorem 5.3. No algorithm for linearly correlated prophets with cardinality constraint can guar-
antee better than an Ω(srow)-approximation, even as r →∞.
Finally, we show that the O(srow)-approximation upper bound for single item can be extended to
the cardinality constraint setting. The intuition is straightforward, as we can simply instantiate
r parallel versions of our previous single item algorithm and assign arriving variables to each at
random. The analysis needs to show that no more than a constant factor is lost due to cases where
members of OPT are sent to the same bucket.
Theorem 5.4. For all r, there is an O(srow)-approximation for the linearly correlated prophet
problem with cardinality constraint r.
We now present formal proofs of the last two theorems.
Proof of Theorem 5.3. For any r, srow, we construct the general tower instance of Example 4.10
with parameter srow, but we simply make r copies of each variable Xi (not independent, but exact
copies). The row sparsity is unchanged. Now we will make the problem easier in two steps.
(1) Allow variables to arrive in batches of size r. The algorithm may select any subset of the
variables (until fulfilling its cardinality constraint), then reject the rest and receive the next batch.
This is a strictly easier problem, so an algorithm’s performance can only improve. Of course this
will not help on this instance, since each batch of r are all identical, and it will turn out to be
optimal to either take them all or none.
(2) Now instead we send the original tower instance (with no duplication), and we give the algorithm
a cardinality constraint of 1, but we allow it to pick a fractional amount of each variable Xi. In
other words, we return exactly to the setting of Theorem 4.12. In each case, the algorithm sees the
same information before making each decision, i.e., the value of the current Xi. In the fractional
problem, the algorithm can pick any fraction pi of Xi, so long as the total amount picked is at most
one. In problem (1) above, the algorithm can pick any fraction cr of the variables that equal the
original Xi, as long as it has does not exceed a total of
r
r . The fractional problem allows more choice
and the benchmarks (normalized) are the same, since the maximum of the duplicated instance will
take all r copies of the largest Xi. So the fractional problem is only easier.
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We now invoke Theorem 4.12, which gives an lower bound of Ω(srow)-approximation on the frac-
tional problem. (Note that srow did not change during the above reduction, although scol did.)
Proof of Theorem 5.4. Given an instance, we create r buckets B1, . . . , Br and place each variable
Xi in a bucket Bj uniformly at random. We then run our algorithm for the linearly correlated
prophet problem with bounded srow in each bucket j (call it ALGj), selecting one item. Given a
fixed assignment of variables to buckets, in each bucket Bj we have by the algorithm’s guarantee
that, with expectation over realizations of {Xi : i ∈ Bj}, by Proposition 4.4
EX[ALGj ] ≥ Ω
(
1
srow
)
· EX[ max
Xi∈Bj
Xi].
Taking expectations over both buckets and variables, we have
E[ALG] =
r∑
j=1
EBEX
[
ALGj
]
≥ Ω
(
1
srow
) r∑
j=1
EBEX
[
max
Xi∈Bj
Xi
]
= r · Ω
(
1
srow
)
EXEB
[
max
Xi∈B1
Xi
]
,
where the last equality is by symmetry of the buckets. Now since OPT = X(1) + · · ·+X(r) where
X(i) is the ith largest variable, and since for fixed variable realizations Pr[X(i) = maxXi′∈B1 Xi′ ] =
1
r
∏i−1
i′=1(1−
1
r ) ≥
1
e·r , we get
E[ALG] ≥ r · Ω
(
1
srow
)
EX
[ r∑
i=1
Pr[X(i) = max
Xi′∈B1
Xi′ ] ·X
(i)
]
≥ r · Ω
(
1
srow
)
EX
[ r∑
i=1
1
e · r
X(i)
]
= Ω
(
1
srow
)
.
5.3 Multiple-Items Augmentation Lemma
In Section 3 we showed a 2-approximation single-item augmentation lemma using the half of
expected-maximum as a threshold. In this section, we prove a 1+o(1) approximation multiple-items
augmentation lemma (Lemma 3.4), assuming the cardinality constraint r is sufficiently large. We
first give a surrogate benchmark OPT′ that competes with OPT. We then define the algorithm
and show that it competes with OPT′.
Surrogate benchmark.
The analysis hinges on theshold τ0 :=
E[OPT]
ǫ , where we call variables Zi and Xi that fall above the
threshold heavy and below light. For light variables, we exclude the scenario where they are very
small, below some threshold τc ≤ ǫ
E[OPT]
r . We will generally use the prime symbol ′ to denote a
version of a variable that is zeroed out if it’s too heavy (or too light). Let
Z ′i = Zi · 1[τc ≤ Zi < τ0] and Z
(i)′ = Z(i) · 1[τc ≤ Zi < τ0].
Let
OPT
′ = OPT′1 +OPT
′
2 where
OPT
′
1 = max
i
Zi · 1[Zi ≥ τ0] and OPT
′
2 =
∑r
j=1 Z
(j)′.
Note that OPT′ only considers one heavy variable and throws all other heavy variables away.
Nevertheless, in Appendix D we will show the following claim that it competes with OPT.
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Claim 5.5. E[OPT′] ≥ (1− 2ǫ)E[OPT].
Algorithm overview.
For intuition, the problem with setting any particular fixed threshold is that variables with in-
significant values of Zi can be boosted by the adversary to some Xi just above the threshold. The
algorithm would use up its r slots and be unable to take the later, larger arrivals that contribute
to OPT.
Therefore, we will define a sequence of thresholds, each a factor of 1− ǫ apart. The algorithm will
have a certain number of slots r˜j for the “bucket” j of arrivals between any two thresholds. For
this fixed bucket, such a boosting strategy by the adversary can only cost the algorithm a factor
of 1− ǫ.
Roughly, this strategy will cover the case where OPT is concentrated. To allow for cases where
most of OPT comes from very rare, very large variables, we will also reserve a slot for such variables
and analyze it separately.
Algorithm definition.
We define a sequence of thresholds. Recall that OPT =
∑r
j=1 Z
(j) where Z(j) is the jth-largest of
Z1, . . . , Zn. Let c =
⌈
1
ǫ ln
r
ǫ2
⌉
and define thresholds
τj = (1− ǫ)
j E[OPT]
ǫ
(j = 0, . . . , c)
Observation 5.6. The largest threshold is τ0 =
E[OPT]
ǫ and the smallest threshold τc ≤
ǫ·E[OPT]
r .
Proof. τ0 is immediate, and we have (1− ǫ)
c ≤ e−ǫc ≤ exp
(
−ǫ1ǫ ln
r
ǫ2
)
= ǫ
2
r .
Now we define the size of each bucket. Recall that we abuse notation by writing Zi ∈ OPT if Zi
is one of the r variables included in the OPT solution. Let
rj = E |{i : Zi ∈ OPT, τj ≤ Zi ≤ τj−1}| (j = 1, . . . , c)
β = 3
√
r ln(c/ǫ)
r˜j = rj + β (j = 1, . . . , c)
r˜0 = 1.
We first define an algorithm ALG′ that does not quite achieve the cardinality constraint r. We will
then modify it to obtain ALG with only a small loss in performance. ALG′ initializes bj = 0 for
j = 0, . . . , c and proceeds as follows when a variable Xi arrives.
1. If Xi < τc, we discard Xi and continue.
2. Otherwise, let j = min{j′ : Xi ≥ τj′}.
3. If bj < r˜j, we take Xi and increment bj. Otherwise (bucket j is full), increment j and repeat
this step. If j > c, stop and discard Xi.
In other words, we attempt to assign Xi to its original bucket, but if that is full, we allow it to fall
into buckets reserved for smaller variables (higher indices j).
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Now, the final algorithm ALG is defined as follows: run ALG′, but each time ALG′ takes an arrival
Xi, discard it independently with probability ǫ. If a variable is not discarded, but the cardinality
constraint r is reached, then discard it anyways.
Analysis.
We show in Appendix D that ALG approximates ALG′.
Lemma 5.7. For all ǫ ≥ 9(ln r)
3/2
r1/4
, we have E[ALG] ≥ (1− 2ǫ)E[ALG′].
Now, we analyze ALG′.
Let us define the contributions of ALG′ and OPT′ bucket-by-bucket. The top bucket of ALG′ is
split into cases where the corresponding Zi is heavy or light. The following are random sets:
Oj = {i ∈ OPT
′ : τj ≤ Zi < τj−1} (j = 1, . . . , c)
O0 = {i ∈ OPT
′ : τ0 ≤ Zi}
Bj = {i ∈ ALG : τj ≤ Xi < τj−1} (j = 1, . . . , c)
Blight0 = {i ∈ ALG
′ : Zi < τ0 ≤ Xi}
Bheavy0 = {i ∈ ALG
′ : τ0 ≤ Zi}.
We use the notation i ∈ OPT′ to denote that i contributes to OPT′, i.e. either Zi is the largest
among {Zj} or Z
′
i is among the r largest of {Z
′
j}. Similarly, we write i ∈ ALG
′ to mean that the
algorithm takes Xi.
Now, we break down ALG′ as follows.
ALG′ = ALG′1 +ALG
′
2 where
ALG′1 =
∑
i∈Bheavy0
Xi and ALG
′
2 =
∑
i∈Blight0
Xi +
c∑
j=1
∑
i∈Bj
Xi.
In other words, ALG′1 tracks the contribution of the special “heavy” bucket, but only in the case
where the underlying variable Zi is heavy. ALG
′
2 tracks the remaining case and all other buckets.
Notice these definitions are only for the purpose of analysis, as Zi is not observable to the algorithm.
Finally, we define
P := Pr[max
i
Xi ≥ τ0].
A key point will be that if P is large, then the algorithm will often get some variable larger than
τ0, which is good enough to compete with OPT.
Lemma 5.8. E[ALG′] ≥ Pǫ E[OPT].
Proof. With probability P , someXi exceeds τ0 =
E[OPT]
ǫ . Since Bucket 0 is reserved for such arrivals
with budget b0 = 1, the algorithm gets such Xi if this occurs, so its expectation is ≥ Pτ0.
Thus, if P ≥ ǫ, we are already done. The rest of the analysis will leverage cases where P is small.
Lemma 5.9. E[ALG′1] ≥ (1− P )E[OPT
′
1].
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Proof.
E[ALG′1] = E
[∑
i
Xi · 1[i ∈ B
heavy
0 ]
]
≥ E
[∑
i
Zi · 1[i ∈ B
heavy
0 ]
]
=
∑
i
Pr[b0 = 0 when i arrives] · E [Zi · 1[Zi ≥ τ0]] (using independence)
≥ (1− P )
∑
i
E [Zi · 1[Zi ≥ τ0]]
≥ (1− P )E[max
i
{Zi · 1[Zi ≥ τ0]}] = (1− P ) · E[OPT
′
1].
The final piece of the argument is to show that the “buckets” strategy works, i.e., it cannot be
disrupted by augmentations. The idea is that we have reserved an accurate number of slots in each
bucket for the case where there is no augmentation. An augmented variable Xi can take away a
bucket slot from some Zi′ , with Zi′ ≫ Zi, but then it will contribute about as much to ALG
′ as Zi′
did to OPT′2. In this case, we should be concerned that OPT
′
2 gets both Zi and Zi′ while ALG
′
only gets Xi, with Xi′ disappearing thanks to the bucket being full. However, the algorithm allows
such an Xi′ to “trickle down” into a lower-tier bucket, in particular, the slot that is not being used
by Xi. And if this slot is full as well, then in any case ALG
′ is competing with OPT′2.
Lemma 5.10. For ǫ ≥ 9(ln r)
3/2
r1/4
, we have E[ALG′2] ≥ (1− ǫ)2E[OPT
′
2].
Proof. First, let C denote the event that none of the OPT′2 buckets are filled to the r˜j capacities,
i.e. C is the event that |Oj | ≤ r˜j for all j = 1, . . . , c.
Claim 5.11. Pr[C] ≥ 1− ǫ.
Proof. Recall that rj = E|Oj |. Because |Oj | is a sum of independent Bernoulli random variables,
we have by a standard Bernstein bound that
Pr[|Oj | − rj ≥
√
2rjt+ t] ≤ e
−t.
Setting t = ln cǫ , we get a bound of
ǫ
c ; a union bound over the buckets will complete the proof. We
just need to show that
√
2rj ln
c
ǫ + ln
c
ǫ ≤ β, as then the probability of exceeding rj + β is only
smaller. As in the proof of Claim D.1, for this choice of ǫ, we have ln cǫ ≤ ln(r), and ln(r) ≤ r, so√
2rj ln
c
ǫ + ln
c
ǫ ≤
√
2r ln cǫ +
√
r ln cǫ ≤ β.
Next we argue that at each tier of thresholds, ALG′ is getting just as many variables as OPT′2,
even if their identities are different. First, a helpful property:
Claim 5.12. Conditioned on C, suppose |Bj | < r˜j for some j ≥ 1. Then |B
light
0 | +
∑j
j′=1 |Bj′ | ≥∑j
j′=1 |Oj′ |.
Proof. Consider any arrival i that contributes to the right side. We claim it is also counted on the
left. We know Xi ≥ Zi ≥ τj, because the variable contributes to the right side. So the algorithm
will attempt to place Xi in some assigned bucket j
′ ≤ j. If it does not succeed because the bucket
is full, it will proceed to j′ + 1, . . . , and possibly eventually j. Because |Bj | < r˜j, we know there
is space for i in bucket j, so the algorithm definitely takes i in bucket j or earlier. By definition,
Zi < τ0, so i cannot be a member of B
heavy
0 . Therefore, it is counted by the left side.
Now we can show the key fact.
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Claim 5.13. Conditioned on C, we have for all j = 1, . . . , c that∣∣∣Blight0
∣∣∣+∑jj′=1 |Bj′ | ≥∑jj′=1 |Oj′ |.
Proof. By induction on j. For j = 1, we must show |Blight0 |+ |B1| ≥ |O1|. Recall that an arrival i is
a member of O1 if τ1 ≤ Zi < τ0. There are two cases. If |B1| = r˜1, i.e. the bucket is full, then the
case is proven as we have assumed event C, which implies |O1| ≤ r˜1. Otherwise, the case follows
by Claim 5.12.
Now consider j > 1. If |Bj | < r˜j , i.e. the bucket is not full, then the case follows by Claim 5.12.
Otherwise, i.e. bucket j is full, then we have |Bj | ≥ |Oj | because of property C. Combining this
with the induction hypothesis proves that |Blight0 |+
∑j
j′=1 |Bj′ | ≥
∑j
j′=1 |Oj′ |.
We are now ready to complete the proof of Lemma 5.10. From Claim 5.13, given event C, we can
make a one-to-one mapping from contributions Z ′i of OPT
′
2 to contributions Xj of ALG
′
2, such
that Xj is in the same bucket or a higher bucket than Z
′
i. (I.e. map all elements of O1 to elements
of B1 or B
light
0 ; map all elements of O2 to remaining elements of these or to elements of B2; and so
on.) For each such pair, we have Xj ≥ (1− ǫ)Z
′
i because, at worst, both are in the same bucket.
5
In total, this implies that, conditioned on C, we always have ALG′2 ≥ (1− ǫ)OPT
′
2; and C occurs
with probability at least 1− ǫ.
Corollary 5.14. For ǫ ≥ 9(ln r)
3/2
r1/4
, we have E[ALG′] ≥ (1− ǫ)2 · E[OPT′].
Proof. If P ≥ ǫ, then by Lemma 5.8, we have E[ALG′] ≥ E[OPT] ≥ E[OPT′], proving the claim.
Otherwise, by Lemma 5.9, E[ALG′1] ≥ (1 − P )E[OPT
′
1] ≥ (1 − ǫ)E[OPT
′
1]; and by Lemma 5.10,
E[ALG′2] ≥ (1− ǫ)2E[OPT
′
2]. So in the case P < ǫ, we have
E[ALG′] = E[ALG′1] + E[ALG
′
2] ≥ (1− ǫ)E[OPT
′
1] + (1− ǫ)
2
E[OPT′2]
≥ (1− ǫ)2E[OPT′].
Proof of Augmentation Lemma 3.4. For ǫ ≤ 12 , ǫ ≥
9(ln r)3/2
r1/4
, we have:
E[ALG]
Lemma 5.7
≥ (1− 2ǫ)E[ALG′]
Corollary 5.14
≥ (1− 2ǫ)3E[OPT′]
Claim 5.5
≥ (1− 2ǫ)4E[OPT].
So we obtain a
(
1 +O(ǫ)
)
-approximation.
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A Unweighted Linear Correlations
In this section we consider a linear correlations model where the nonnegative matrix A from X =
A·Y is unweighted, i.e., each of its entry is either 0 or 1. Alternately, for i ∈ [n] there are known sets
S1, S2, . . . , Sn ⊆ [m] such that Xi =
∑
j∈Si Yj. Our lower bound tower instance from Section 4.3
no longer holds as it crucially expolits that matrix A has entries that decrease exponentially in ǫ.
Can we do better than a Θ (min{scol, srow}) approximation ratio? One might wonder if there exists
5For example, we may have Z′i ≈ τ4 while Xj = τ3 = (1− ǫ)τ4.
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an alternate hardness instance that only has 0− 1 entries in A. We show that this is not the case.
In fact, there exist simple threshold-based constant approximation algorithms.
Theorem 2.4. The unweighted linear correlations problem has a fixed threshold constant-factor
approximation algorithm.
The main intuition in the proof of Theorem 2.4 is that for the unweighted problem each independent
Yj has limited “influence” on the Xis. This is because either Yj appears with coefficient 0, in which
case it has no influence on the value Xi, or it appears with coefficient 1, in which case it has the
same influence in the value of every such Xi. A threshold algorithm is therefore difficult to fool
because unlike the tower instance, it is not possible to have a scenario where a Yj is very large but
our algorithm selects it within an Xi where it appears with a small coefficient ǫ.
For readers familiar with the revenue-maximization result of Babaioff et al. [BILW14], i.e., the best
of selling items individually and selling all the items together in a single bundle is a constant factor
approximation to optimal revenue, our result has a similar flavor, although the technical details
are quite different. We decompose our problem instance into a “core” and a “tail” part. The tail
consists of cases where any Yj exceeds a boundary τ ; the core, the rest. For the tail case we show
that approximating E[maxj{Yj}] (the best individual item) suffices, and in the core case we can
approximate the best bundle Xi.
This argument will show that there is one fixed threshold τcore such that the algorithm taking
the first arrival above τcore achieves a constant approximation to the optimal core contribution to
max{Xi}; and similarly for τtail and the tail part. There remains a corner case, where we show a
fixed threshold equal to the boundary τ gives a constant factor. Thus, for any given instance, one
can select among τ, τcore, τtail to get a fixed-threshold constant-factor approximation algorithm.
A.1 Notation and Proof Overview
We first choose a real number τ representing a boundary. Let pj = Pr[Yj > τ ]. We set τ such that∏
j(1− pj) = 1/2, i.e., with half probability all Yj are below τ . We let the set A be all “heavy” Yj
variables: A := {j : Yj > τ}.
Recall that for each Xi, the set of active indices is Si, so we have Xi =
∑
j∈Si Yj . We first upper-
bound OPT by contributions from the core event that A = ∅ (all Yj are small) and from the
remaining tail event.
Claim A.1.
E[OPT] ≤ E[max
i
Xi | A = ∅] +
∑
j
pj · E[Yj | Yj > τ ].
Proof. For any outcome of Yjs, we separately count those in A (larger than τ) and the rest, and
relax the objective to always take the large ones:
max
i
Xi = max
i
{
∑
j∈Si
Yj} ≤ max
i
{
∑
j∈Si∩A
Yj}+
∑
j∈A
Yj.
Now taking expectations on both sides,
E[OPT] = E[max
i
Xi] ≤ E[max
i
{
∑
j∈Si∩A
Yj}] + E[
∑
j∈A
Yj]
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≤ E[max
i
Xi | A = ∅] +
∑
j
pj · E[Yj | Yj > τ ].
To justify that E[maxi{
∑
j∈Si∩A Yj}] ≤ E[maxiXi | A = ∅], use a coupling argument: First draw
all Yj from their initial distributions and consider the value of maxi{
∑
j∈Si∩A Yj}. Now take any
variables Yj > τ , and redraw them until they fall below τ . The value of the inner sum can only
increase, but now we are exactly obtaining E[maxiXi | A = ∅].
Given that Claim A.1 upper-bounds OPT by the sum of two terms, our proof goes in two steps.
First, we approximate the tail contributions
∑
j pj · E[Yj | Yj > τ ]. In Lemma A.2 we use the
Augmentation Lemma 3.2 to give a simple fixed threshold-τtail algorithm with expected value
Ω(max{Yj}). This is a bit surprising because the lower bound in Section 4.3 actually proves such
a result is not possible for weighted linear correlations. In Claim A.3, we show that Ω(max{Yj})
suffices to capture the tail term.
To capture the core contributions E[maxiXi | A = ∅], in Claim A.5 we argue that for all instances
where Yjs are bounded by τ , we can use concentration of XOS functions to argue that Pr[maxiXi >
1/2 · E[maxiXi]] is at least a constant, and hence a simple fixed threshold-τcore algorithm suffices.
This second step also holds for prophets with weighted linear correlations. There is also a corner
case where τ is too large to apply concentration. But in this case, setting a threshold τ will directly
achieve a constant factor.
A.2 Proof
Lemma A.2. For the prophet inequality problem with unweighted linear correlations, there exists
a fixed threshold algorithm with expected value Ω(max{Yj}).
Proof. Define Zi to be the sum of Yjs that appear in Xi and have not appeared in any Xi′ for i
′ < i.
Since every Yj appears in some Zi, we know max{Zi} ≥ max{Yj}. The Augmentation Lemma 3.2
now completes the proof.
Now we argue that E[maxj Yj ] takes care of the second term in Claim A.1.
Claim A.3.
E[max
j
Yj] ≥
1
2
·
∑
j
pj · E[Yj | Yj > τ ].
Proof. We have
E[max
j
Yj] ≥
∑
j
Pr[A = {j}] · E[max
j
Yj | A = {j}] ≥
∑
j
pj
2
· E[Yj | A = {j}],
where the second inequality uses Pr[A = {j}] = Pr[Yj > τ ] Pr[Yj′ ≤ τ(∀j
′ 6= j)] ≥ (pj)
(
1
2
)
and that
maxj Yj given that A = {j} is the same as Yj .
Corollary A.4. For any instance with unweighted linear correlations, there exists τtail such that
the algorithm setting a fixed threshold of τtail obtains E[ALG] ≥ Ω
(∑
j pj · E[Yj | Yj > τ ]
)
.
We now turn to the core portion of contributions to OPT.
Claim A.5. Let V = E[maxiXi | A = ∅]. If the boundary satisfies τ ≤ V/10, there exists τcore
such that the algorithm setting a fixed threshold of τcore obtains E[ALG] ≥ Ω(V ).
24
Proof. Let Y ′j be a copy of Yj conditioned on falling into the range [0, τ ]. Let X
′
i =
∑
j∈Si Y
′
j and
let W = maxiX
′
i. We have E[maxiXi | A = ∅] = E[W ] = V .
Now, note that W is an XOS function of the independent Y ′i variables (meaning is a maximum of
weighted combinations). Thus we can apply the concentration of XOS functions (more generally,
for self-bounding functions, see e.g. [Von10]) to get
Pr
[
W < (1− δ) · E[W ]
]
≤ exp
(
− δ2 ·
E[W ]
2τ
)
.
In particular, for δ = 1/2 we get
Pr
[
W <
1
2
E[W ]
]
≤ exp
(
−
E[W ]
8τ
)
≤ γ,
for some constant γ < 1, using that τ ≤ E[W ]/10. Hence the expected value of an algorithm that
sets a threshold of 12E[W ] is at least
Pr
[
W ≥
1
2
E[W ]
]
·
1
2
E[W ] ≥ Ω
(
E[W ]
)
.
Now we have all the tools to prove our main theorem.
Proof of Theorem 2.4. By Claim A.1, one of the follwing is at least a 2-approximation to the
prophet: V := E[maxiXi | A = ∅], and E[
∑
j pj · E[Yj | Yj > τ ]. Suppose it is the latter. Then by
Claim A.3, setting a fixed threshold of τtail gives a constant-factor approximation.
So suppose we have V ≥ E[OPT]/2. If τ > V/10, then we can set a fixed threshold of τ : with
probability at least 12 , some Xi ≥ τ (because some Yj ≥ τ), so we obtain performance at least
1
2τ ≥
1
40E[OPT].
Finally, if V ≥ E[OPT]/2 and τ ≤ V/10, then by Claim A.5, setting a fixed threshold of τcore gives
a constant-factor approximation.
B Negatively Associated Values
In this section we show a 2 approximation ratio for negatively associated random values, a prop-
erty that is known to imply negative correlation6 [JDP83]. Formally, we say {Xj} are negatively
associated if for all monotone increasing functions f, g and disjoint subsets S, S′ ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, and
for all a, b ∈ R, we have
Pr
[
f(Xj : j ∈ S) ≥ a
]
≤ Pr
[
f(Xj : j ∈ S) ≥ a | g(Xj : j ∈ S
′) ≤ b
]
.
Let τ = 12E[maxiXi] and let P = Pr[maxiXi ≥ τ ]. We can write down precisely the usual prophet
proof with just one line requiring additional justification.
E[ALGτ ] = P · τ +
∑n
i=1 Pr[Xi′ < τ(∀i
′ < i)] · E [(Xi − τ)+ | Xi′ < τ(∀i′ < i)]
≥ P · τ + (1− P ) ·
∑n
i=1 E [(Xi − τ)
+ | Xi′ < τ(∀i
′ < i)]
≥ P · τ + (1− P ) ·
∑n
i=1 E [(Xi − τ)
+] ,
where the last inequality uses negative association as (Xi − τ)
+ is a monotone function as is
maxi′<iXi′ . We can also use weaker notions of negative correlation for the last inequality, e.g.,
6We say {Xj} are negatively correlated if for all i, i
′ we have Cov(Xi, Xi′) ≤ 0.
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NLODS as in Section 2 of [RSC92]. Now repeating the old prophet inequality analysis,
n∑
i=1
E
[
(Xi − τ)
+
]
≥ E
[ n∑
i=1
(Xi − τ)
+
]
≥ E
[
max
i
Xi − τ
]
= τ.
Thus, E[ALGτ ] ≥ P · τ + (1− P ) · τ = τ.
C Bounded scol and Small Cardinality Constraint
For the r-uniform matroid problem with bounded scol, we have shown in Section 5.1 a 1 + o(1)
approximation for large r tending to infinity. Here, we complement that result with a gracefully-
improving approximation ratio for all r that smoothly interpolates between O (scol) for r = 1 (the
classic result) and O(1) for r ≥ scol.
The approach is an extension of our algorithm for bounded column sparsity in the r = 1 case.
Theorem C.1. For any scol, r, the linearly correlated prophets problem with column sparsity scol
and cardinality constraint r admits an approximation ratio of 2e2 ·max
{
1, scolr
}
.
In other words, as r = 2, 3, . . . , scol, the guarantee improves to a constant factor times
2
scol
, 3scol , . . . , 1.
Proof. Let there be r sets (“buckets”) B1, . . . , Br. If r < scol, let there also be a “discard pile” B0.
Let c = max{r, scol}.
For each Xi, place it in a bucket j ∈ {1, . . . , r} each chosen with probability
1
c . If r < scol, then
with the remaining probability of scol−rscol , place Xi in the discard bucket B0.
For each bucket j = 1, . . . , r, give the bucket a cardinality constraint of 1 item and run the following
algorithm (based on the r = 1 case). Let Sj = {i : Xi ∈ Bj} and note that they are disjoint for
different j. When a variable Xi arrives, send it to the algorithm for its bucket, or if it is in B0,
discard Xi and continue. In bucket j, we run an inclusion-threshold algorithm with Sj and with
τj to be determined next. Assign each Yj′ to the first Xi ∈ Bj that includes it, i.e., let Ti = {j
′ :
Aij′ > 0 and Ai′j′=0(∀i
′ < i, i′ ∈ Sj)}. Let Zi =
∑
j′∈Ti Aij′Yj′ , and let τj =
1
2E[maxi∈Sj Zi].
Claim C.2. For each bucket j ∈ {1, . . . , r}, the expected value selected by the algorithm is at least
1
2e · E[maxi∈Sj Xi].
Proof. By construction each Zi is independent of all previous Xi in the same bucket, so by the Aug-
mentation Lemma 3.2, bucket j obtains expected reward at least 12E[maxi∈Sj Zi] with randomness
over the variables.
For each Yj′ with Aij′ > 0, we claim Pr[j ∈ Ti] ≥
1
e because there are at most scol−1 other variables
Xi′ that include Yj′ , and each misses bucket j with probability at least 1 −
1
scol
, so they all miss
bucket j with probability at least (1 − 1scol )
scol−1 ≥ 1e . In this case, we must have j ∈ Ti. So for
each fixed Xi, we have with probability only over the bucket assignments and construction of Sj,
E[Zi] =
∑
j′
Pr[j′ ∈ Ti] ·Aij′Yj′ ≥
1
e
∑
j′
Aij′Yj′ =
1
e
Xi.
Combining these facts, each bucket j obtains expected reward at least 12eE[maxi∈Sj Xi].
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Write EB for an expectation taken over the bucketing and EX for expectation over the realiza-
tions of the variables. The above gives that for every set of variable realizations, EB[ALG] ≥
1
2e
∑r
j=1 EB[maxi∈Sj Xi]. By linearity of expectation and symmetry of the buckets, we have
EX,B[ALG] ≥
r
2e
EX,B
[
max
i∈S1
Xi
]
. (3)
Claim C.3. EX,B
[
maxi∈S1 Xi
]
≥ 1e·c · EX[OPT], where c = max{r, scol}.
Proof. Let the random variable X(i) equal the ith-largest realized variable, i.e., in particular
OPT =
r∑
i=1
X(i).
Recall that any fixed variable falls into bucket B1 with probability
1
c . Fixing realizations of
X(1), . . . ,X(r), we have with probability taken only over the buckets,
EB
[
max
i∈S1
Xi
]
≥
r∑
i=1
Pr
[
X(i) ∈ B1 and X
(i′) 6∈ B1(∀i
′ < i)
]
X(i)
=
r∑
i=1
1
c
(
1−
1
c
)i−1
X(i) ≥
1
e · c
r∑
i=1
X(i) =
1
e · c
OPT.
Now taking an expectation on both sides over the realizations of X proves the claim.
Finally, combine Claim C.3 with Inequality (3) to get
E[ALG] ≥
r
2e
EXEB
[
max
i∈S1
Xi
]
≥
r
2e2c
EX[OPT],
which proves Theorem C.1.
D Missing Proofs
D.1 Missing Proofs from Section 2
Lemma 2.1. In the linear correlations model, even for srow = scol = 2 there exist instances where
every fixed threshold τ algorithm ALGτ has an approximation ratio at least Ω(n).
Proof of Lemma 2.1. We consider the srow = scol = 2 tower instance (Example 2.3), with suffi-
ciently small ǫ chosen later. We claim that E[maxiXi] = Ω(n) while any fixed threshold-τ algorithm
has E[ALGτ ] ≤ 3.
First, we bound E[ALGτ ]. Let pj = Pr[ALGτ takes Xj and Yj is active]. In this case the algo-
rithm’s reward includes Yj =
1
ǫj
with coefficient 1. Let p′j = Pr[ALGτ takes Xj−1 and Yj is active].
In this case its reward includes Yj =
1
ǫj
with coefficient ǫ. We note that pj, p
′
j ≤ Pr[Yj is active] = ǫ
j .
By summing over Y1, . . . , Yn, we have
E[ALGτ ] =
n∑
j=1
(
pj
1
ǫj
+ (p′j)(ǫ)
1
ǫj
)
≤
n∑
j=1
(
pj
1
ǫj
+ ǫ
)
= nǫ+
n∑
j=1
pj
1
ǫj
.
We argue that pj = 0 for all but at most two terms. Let j
∗ satisfy ǫ−(j
∗+1) < τ ≤ ǫ−j
∗
, or j∗ = 1
if τ ≤ 1ǫ . We claim pj = 0 if j ≤ j
∗ − 2: assuming ǫ < 12 , we have
Xj ≤
2
ǫj
≤
1
ǫj+1
< τ,
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so Xj is never taken. We also claim pj = 0 if j ≥ j
∗ + 1: If Yj is active, then
Xj−1 ≥ ǫ
1
ǫj
≥
1
ǫj−1
≥ τ,
so Xj−1 is taken and Xj is not. So we have pj = 0 unless j ∈ {j∗− 1, j∗}, in which case pj ≤ ǫj. So
E[ALGτ ] ≤ nǫ+
n∑
j=1
pj
1
ǫj
≤ nǫ+ 2 ≤ 3
for ǫ ≤ 1n .
For the benchmark, since maxi{Xi} ≥ maxj{Yj}, it suffices to show E[maxj Yj] = Ω(n). Now,
E[max
j
{Yj}] =
∑n
i=1 Pr[Yj = 0 (∀j > i)] · Pr[Yi 6= 0] ·
(
1
ǫi
)
≥ Pr[Yj = 0 (∀j)] ·
∑n
i=1 Pr[Yi 6= 0] ·
(
1
ǫi
)
.
Since Pr[Yi 6= 0] = ǫ
i, we get
E[max
j
{Yj}] ≥ Pr[Yj = 0 (∀j)] · n
≥
(
1−
∑
j Pr[Yj 6= 0]
)
· n ≥ (1− nǫ) · n ≥ n/2
for any choice of ǫ ≤ 12n . This gives an approximation ratio of at least
n/2
3 =
n
6 for ǫ ≤
1
2n .
D.2 Missing Proofs from Section 5.3
Proof of Claim 5.5. First, consider supplementing OPT′ by including tiny elements below τc when
there is room, i.e. let Z(i)′′ = Z(i)1[Zi < τ0] and consider OPT′′2 =
∑r
j=1 Z
(j)′′. Let OPT′′ =
OPT
′
1 + OPT
′′
2 . On a case-by-case basis, OPT
′′ differs from OPT′ by at most r elements, each
at most τc ≤
ǫ
rE[OPT]. This proves that E[OPT
′] ≥ E[OPT′′] − ǫE[OPT]. We next prove that
E[OPT′′] ≥ (1− ǫ)E[OPT], which completes the proof of the claim.
Let H be the event there exists a heavy element, i.e. maxi Zi ≥ τ0 = E[OPT]/ǫ. Let p = Pr[H].
So,
E[OPT′′] = p · E[OPT′′ | H] + (1− p) · E[OPT′′ | ¬H]
= p · E[OPT′′ | H] + (1− p) · E[OPT | ¬H]
≥ p · E[Z(1) | H] + (1− p) · E[OPT | ¬H]. (4)
Now, we claim E[OPT | H] ≤ E[Z(1) | H] + E[OPT]. Proof: let Mi be the event that i =
argmaxi′ Zi′ and Zi ≥ τ0. Let OPT−i be the sum of the largest r− 1 elements excluding Zi. Note
that conditioning on all others lying below Zi, for any fixed Zi, only decreases OPT−i, as the
variables are independent.
E[OPT | H] = E[Z(1) | H] +
∑n
i=1 Pr[Mi | H] · E[OPT−i |Mi]
≤ E[Z(1) | H] +
∑n
i=1 Pr[Mi | H] · E[OPT−i]
≤ E[Z(1) | H] +
∑n
i=1 Pr[Mi | H] · E[OPT] = E[Z
(1) | H] + E[OPT].
Using this,
E[OPT] = p · E[OPT | H] + (1− p) · E[OPT | ¬H]
≤ p · E[Z(1) | H] + p · E[OPT] + (1− p) · E[OPT | ¬H].
28
This implies
(1− p)E[OPT] ≤ p · E[Z(1) | H] + (1− p) · E[OPT | ¬H].
Combining with Inequality (4) gives E[OPT′′] ≥ (1 − p)E[OPT]. We have p ≤ ǫ by Markov’s
inequality: p = Pr[maxi Zi ≥ τ0] ≤ E[maxi Zi]/τ0 ≤ E[OPT]/τ0 = ǫ. This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 5.7. Suppose r is large enough that ǫ ≤ 0.5, otherwise the lemma is immediate.
Let δ := 1+c·βr .
Claim D.1. ǫ ≥ 2δ.
Proof. Using that ǫ ≥ r−1/4, we have c := ⌈1ǫ ln
r
ǫ2
⌉ ≤ 3ǫ ln(r). Further using that ǫ ≥ 3r
−1/4,
this implies ln cǫ ≤ ln
(
r1/2 ln(r)
)
≤ ln(r). Therefore, β := 3
√
r ln cǫ ≤ 3
√
r ln(r). Then c · β ≤(
3
ǫ ln(r)
) (
3
√
r ln(r)
)
≤ 9
√
r(ln r)3/2
ǫ . Using that ǫ ≥ 9r
−1/4 (ln r)3/2, this gives c · β ≤ r3/4, so
1 + c · β ≤ 2r3/4, so δ ≤ 2r−1/4 ≤ ǫ/2.
Let K be the number of arrivals taken by ALG, a random variable.
Claim D.2. With at least 1 − ǫ probability, K < r (i.e. ALG does not reach its cardinality
constraint).
Proof. The number of arrivals taken by ALG′ is at most
∑c
j=0 r˜j = 1 + c · β +
∑c
j=1 rj. Because
OPT takes at most r arrivals pointwise, and thus in expectation, we have
∑c
j=1 rj ≤ r. So ALG
′
takes at most, in the worst case, K ′ = r + 1 + c · β = r(1 + δ) arrivals. Because ALG keeps each
independently with probability 1−ǫ ≤ 1−2δ < (1−δ)2, the chance it reaches r is upper-bounded by
the chance that a Binomial(K ′, (1 − δ)2) variable exceeds r. This is upper-bounded by the chance
it exceeds K ′(1− δ)2(1 + δ) = r(1− δ)2(1 + δ)2 = r(1− δ2)2 < r. So by a Chernoff bound,
Pr[K ≥ r] ≤ Pr[Binom(K ′, (1− δ)2) ≥ K ′(1− δ)2(1 + δ)] ≤ exp
(
−δ2K ′(1− δ)2
3
)
.
We have δ ≤ ǫ/2 ≤ 0.25, and K ′ ≥ r, so K ′(1− δ)2 ≥ r2 . Also, δ ≥
c·β
r ≥
β
r .
Pr[K ≥ r] ≤ exp
(
−δ2r
6
)
≤ exp
(
−β2
6r
)
≤ exp
(
− ln
c
ǫ
)
≤ ǫ.
Now, each time ALG′ obtains some variable Xi, ALG also obtains it unless either: it has reached
its cardinality constraint; or it independently discards Xi (with probability ǫ). By a union bound
over these two events, when ALG′ obtains Xi, ALG also obtains it except with probability 1− 2ǫ.
So E[ALG] ≥ (1− 2ǫ)E[ALG′], which proves Lemma 5.7.
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